Present crisis in Pakistan

The background to the present crisis in Pakistan is related to Gen. Musharraf’s accession to power and the phenomenon of the mutually reinforcing link between the Pakistan Army and the groups promoting Islamist jihad. The Pakistan Amy had confined Islamist jihadi groups to acting in its interest in Afghanistan. The mutually reinforcing links between the Pakistan Army and the Muslim jihadi groups primarily meant for Afghanistan and India has led to a mutually reinforcing link between Muslim jihadi groups worldwide.
This did not end with Musharraf coming to power. In 2002, he in fact, rigged the elections in a way that the Islamic parties came to power in Balochistan and NWFP. When the Northern Alliance took Kabul, elements of the Taliban under the leadership of Mullah Dadullah escaped into the NWFP. The mostly Kandahar-based Taliban leadership largely crossed from Chaman into Pakistan. Pakistani cooperation with the Americans in their fight against the Al Qaeda was selectively confined to providing second string leadership to the Americans and until the end of 2006, not a single Taliban leader was killed or captured.
The Pashtun element figured for the first time in the history of the Pakistan Army when Pashtun officers refusal to fight in the NWFP and eventually faced court martial. Musharraf also lost the support of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA). The duality of Musharraf’s policy is that when the Army refused to fight he was forced to strike a deal with the Taliban. And today in the NWFP, at least 6 districts are totally Talibanized. This has spread across from Naoshera to Islamabad resulting in the Lal Masjid phenomenon. Under the constitution, Musharraf has to go in for elections this year. The deadline of the Assembly Elections and his term as Army Chief both expire in December.
On 9 March 2007, the Chief Justice was removed from his post. He was proving an embarrassment to the Army for accepting hundreds of human rights cases for consideration. But, the result of sacking the Chief Justice was the worm on which the judiciary turned. The doctrine of necessity by which every coup was justified was pushed aside. This unnerved the armed forces establishment and Musharraf himself. Rather than allowing it to go through, he clamped down from the top. There was total rage when the Army sat aside when Pashtuns were killed by the Mohajirs in Karachi. For the first time, Musharraf’s Mohajir identity became a factor and the Chief Justice became a hero in the Punjab. On 1 June 2007, a Corps Commanders Meeting was held that issued a statement that spoke of - "the malicious campaigns launched against the mechanism of the state by vested interests". The last time such a meeting had issued such a statement was in 1977 prior to Gen. Zia-ul-Haq’s coup.
What are the options for the General? Can he go for elections and get elected by the current assembly? He cannot go to elections without a deal with Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and without the support of the Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam) (PML-Q). Can he crack down militarily with martial law? Things in the Punjab have gone too far and public opinion has risen making it hard for the Army to be called in. While the Army will stand by Musharraf in Sindh and Balochistan, in Punjab, the Mohajir image will stick and the Army will not be a part of this.
Gen. Musharraf’s credibility has come into question and even if Bhutto and the others come to power in a coalition with him, it will be an uneasy alliance. In this scenario, when it comes to nuclear policy, the India policy and the Afghanistan policy, the Army is going to call the shots. There is increasing American and NATO frustration in dealing with the revived Taliban and this is going to result in more and more attacks by the Americans across the Durand Line, thus complicating the Pak-Afghan relationship.
The Iran factor is an imponderable. The Iranians allege that Afghanistan is also being used against them. Pakistan’s diplomatic options are narrowing. For India, this means that "the best bet" theories do not work. Our relations with Pakistan will be determined by objective realities within Pakistan and Pakistan’s geopolitical situation. If Gen. Musharraf has come forward with new proposals on Kashmir, India must keep talking, so that we are not dragged into the internal politics of Pakistan. We must avoid "the best bet" syndrome and deal with them as we deal with any other neighbor because the military buildup of Pakistan is continuing with Chinese help.